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Can Hume Deny Reid’s Dilemma? 
ANTHONY NGUYEN 
 
Abstract: Reid’s dilemma concludes that, whether the idea associated with a denied proposition 
is lively or faint, Hume is committed to saying that it is either believed or merely conceived. In 
neither case would there be denial. If so, then Hume cannot give an adequate account of denial.  
I consider and reject Powell’s suggestion that Hume could have advanced a “Content Contrary” 
account of denial that avoids Reid’s dilemma. However, not only would a Humean Content 
Contrary account be viciously circular, textual evidence suggests that Hume did not hold such an 
account. I then argue that Govier’s distinction between force and vivacity cannot help Hume. Not 
only did Hume fail to recognize this distinction, we can advance a variant of Reid’s dilemma 
even if we distinguish force from vivacity. 
 
1. Introduction 
Notoriously, David Hume had ambitious plans to do much with very little. In particular, he 
wielded impressions, ideas, and a few principles concerning them to great effect. With such 
sparse resources, Hume claimed to have demonstrated that “[w]e have . . . no idea of substance” 
(T.1.1.6.1; SBN 16); that “[t]here is no object, which implies the existence of any other” 
(T.1.3.6.1; SBN 86); that “[w]e have no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain 
objects, which have been always conjoined together” (T.1.3.6.15; SBN 93, Hume’s emphasis); 
and much else besides.1 
Given such ambitions, it is no wonder that much of Hume’s philosophy is disputed. I 
will focus on an important but often overlooked topic in Hume scholarship: Hume’s treatment of 
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denial—the positive rejection of a claim or proposition. Not only would Hume’s philosophical 
system be unacceptable if it could not accommodate such a quotidian propositional attitude, but 
there is theoretical fruit for Hume to reap if he can capture denial. As Lewis Powell notes, Hume 
can simply treat “affirming a conjunction [as] a conjunction of affirmations” (8n19). But then 
much rests on Hume’s ability to adequately treat denial: “[G]iven a proper account of negative 
contents and conjunctive contents, one can recursively define an account of all other logical 
connectives” (Powell, 22).2 It is important to Hume’s philosophical program that he can 
adequately treat denial. 
But a puzzle from Thomas Reid faces Hume’s treatment of denial. Before presenting 
Reid’s puzzle, however, we must first get a grip on Hume’s views about belief. Hume tells us 
this much about the nature of belief: 
[T]he idea of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and that 
when after the simple conception of any thing we wou’d conceive it as existent, 
we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea. Thus when we 
affirm, that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being…But as ’tis 
certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence 
of an object, and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or 
composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows that it must lie in the 
manner, in which we conceive it. (T.1.3.7.2; SBN 95, Hume’s emphasis) 
[A]s belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it 
can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity. An opinion, 
therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin’d, a LIVELY IDEA RELATED 
TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION. (T.1.3.7.2; SBN 96) 
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To believe that something exists and to conceive of that same thing involve the same idea. It is 
not as though an (imagistic!) idea of existence is tacked onto a mere conception—a faint idea—
of a thing in order to yield belief in that thing’s existence. Instead, a belief in a thing’s existence 
is a lively idea that is appropriately related to a present impression.3 
To defend these claims, Hume presents the following case: 
Nothing is more evident, than that those ideas, to which we assent, are more 
strong, firm, and vivid, than the loose reveries of a castle-builder. If one person 
sits down to read a book as romance, and another one as a true history, they 
plainly receive the same ideas, and in the same order; nor does the incredulity of 
the one, and the belief of other hinder them from putting the very same sense 
upon their author. His words produce the same ideas in both; tho’ his testimony 
has not the same influence on them. The latter has a more lively conception of all 
the incidents. He enters deeper into the concerns of the persons…While the 
former, who gives no credit to the testimony of the author, has a more faint and 
languid conception of all these particulars. (T.1.3.7.8; SBN 97–98) 
So far, we have been presented with an intuitive, Humean picture of belief.4 But what is Hume’s 
account of denial? Picking up on Hume’s claim that the only difference between belief and mere 
conception is a difference in how lively the idea is, Reid advances the following dilemma against 
the very possibility of denial for Hume: 
Take the example of the idea of a future state after death. One man believes it 
firmly; this means that he has a strong and lively idea of it. Another man neither 
believes nor disbelieves, i.e. he has a weak and faint idea. Suppose now a third 
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person believes firmly that there is no life after death; I am at a loss to know 
whether his idea is faint or lively: if it is faint, then there can be a firm belief 
where the idea is faint; if the idea is lively, then the belief in a future state and the 
belief that there is no future state must be one and the same! (30, Reid’s 
emphasis) 
Reid assumes that, for Hume, denying a proposition1 involves having before one’s mind the very 
same idea one would have before one’s mind if one were affirming, or merely entertaining, that 
proposition1.5 This is a crucial assumption to which we shall return later. But given this 
assumption, Reid’s dilemma is damning. If denying a proposition involves having a lively idea, 
then—for Hume—it is impossible to distinguish denial from affirmation. After all, Hume claims 
that we believe something just in case the associated idea is lively in our mind’s eye. On the 
other hand, if denying a proposition involves having a faint idea, then—for Hume—one denies a 
proposition just in case one merely entertains it. After all, Hume claims that we merely entertain 
something just in case the associated idea is faint in our mind’s eye. Neither horn of this dilemma 
is acceptable. So Reid concludes that Hume cannot adequately treat denial.6 For the sake of 
explicitness, I state Reid’s dilemma in premise-conclusion form below:7 
 
1. If Hume’s philosophy accommodates denial, then, for a denied proposition p, the idea 
associated with p is (in the mind of the denier) either lively or faint. 
2. If the idea is lively, then p is affirmed, not denied. 
3. If the idea is faint, then p is merely entertained, not denied.  




If sound, Reid’s objection spells disaster for Hume. Hume’s philosophy would be 
incompatible with anyone’s denying anything. Plainly, the result that no one denies anything is 
absurd. So we must ask whether Reid has really forced Hume’s hand. Does Hume have the 
philosophical resources to slip the punch of Reid’s dilemma?9 
I deny that Hume can overcome this dilemma. In section 2, I discuss an account of 
denial that it seems Hume could have accepted in order to evade Reid’s dilemma. In section 3, I 
argue that not only is this account viciously circular, Hume instead held a different account of 
denial that makes him susceptible to Reid’s dilemma. In section 4, I reply to the objection that 
Hume could have distinguished force and vivacity in order to evade Reid’s dilemma. I conclude 
that Reid’s dilemma succeeds: Hume cannot offer an adequate account of denial. 
 
2. A Charitable Interpretation of Hume’s Views on Denial?  
2.1. Evidence that Hume Held a Content-Contrary Account 
Reid’s objection assumes that Hume accepts what Powell calls ‘an Act-Contrary account of 
denial’ (Powell, 4–5). On an Act-Contrary account, the content of a denial is the same as the 
content of an affirmation. I will assume that, for Hume, ideas are the contents of affirmations and 
denials. Figuratively speaking, an Act-Contrary account “posits both a cognitive thumbs-up and 
a cognitive thumbs-down. If I believe C and you disagree with me, I mentally give C the thumbs-
up, and you mentally give C the thumbs-down” (Powell, 6, his emphasis). Stroud describes Act-
Contrary accounts as follows: 
On [the Act-Contrary] view we have only the one idea, that of God, or of God as 
existing, and we can conceive it either by assenting and thereby believing that 
God exists, or by denying and thereby believing that God does not exist. And both 
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of these “attitudes” are to be distinguished from simple conception. (75, my 
emphasis) 
It is the assumption that Hume accepts an Act-Contrary account of denial that gets Reid’s 
dilemma up and running. After all, the horns of Reid’s dilemma concern, of a denied proposition, 
whether its unique content—the idea associated with that proposition—is lively or faint. This 
suggests that Hume, if he is to have an account of denial, must reject any Act-Contrary account.10 
 The alternative is to accept what Powell calls “a Content-Contrary account of denial” 
(Powell, 4–5). On Content-Contrary accounts, any two agents disagree about any proposition p 
just in case one agent affirms p and the other affirms p’s negation. Suppose I affirm some 
proposition C but you disagree with me. Then, figuratively speaking, on a Content-Contrary 
account, “I stamp C with approval, [but] you do not. Instead, you stamp approval on C’s 
opposite” (Powell, 6).  
Indeed, if Hume accepts a Content-Contrary Account, then Reid’s dilemma poses no 
threat to Hume. To ease discussion, I reproduce Reid’s dilemma below: 
 
1. If Hume’s philosophy accommodates denial, then, for a denied proposition p, the idea 
associated with p is (in the mind of the denier) either lively or faint. 
2. If the idea is lively, then p is affirmed, not denied. 
3. If the idea is faint, then p is merely entertained, not denied.  
4. Therefore, Hume’s philosophy does not accommodate denial. 
 
Suppose, for now, that Hume accepted a Content-Contrary account. If p is contingent, he should 
deny (3). A denied proposition p may be faint and yet denied. For Hume, denying p—at least 
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when p is contingent—requires entertaining p: “ ’Tis confest, that in all cases, wherein we 
dissent from any person, we conceive both sides of the question; but . . . we can believe only 
one” (T.1.3.7.4; SBN 95, my emphasis). On the Content-Contrary account, the proposition p is 
not denied in virtue of the denier’s having before her mind p’s content—the idea associated with 
p—in a faint manner. Instead, p is denied in virtue of the denier’s having before her mind the 
content of p’s negation—again, some idea—in a lively manner. To deny a proposition p just is to 
stand in the right relation—that of affirmation—to p’s negation.  This is compatible with the idea 
associated with p being faint. In fact, if one who denied p had a lively idea of p, then (2) would 
entail that this agent must both affirm and deny p!11 
This holds whenever p is contingent. If p is impossible, Hume should instead deny (1). 
Effectively, this is to accuse Reid of advancing a false dilemma. Hume denies that we can 
conceive, or bring before our minds, any impossibility: 
The answer is easy with regard to propositions, that are prov’d by intuition or 
demonstration. In that case, the person, who assents to, not only conceives of the 
ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily determin’d to conceive them 
in that manner, either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas. Whatever 
is absurd is unintelligible; nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive of any 
thing contrary to a demonstration. (T.1.3.7.3; SBN 95). 
Were [a proposition] demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and 
could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. (EHU 4.2; SBN 26) 
The mind can always conceive any effect to follow from any cause, and indeed 
any event to follow upon another: whatever we conceive is possible, at least in a 
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metaphysical sense: but wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is 
impossible, and implies a contradiction. (Abstract 13–14)  
This is Hume’s (in)famous thesis that conceivability entails possibility. Hume denies that we 
have ideas of the impossible. We cannot conceive of impossibilities. Therefore, if p is 
impossible, no one can have an idea of it; p, if impossible, becomes unintelligible for Hume.12 
So, (1) is not true when p is impossible. This is important because we sometimes deny 
impossibilities. 
In fact, this observation suggests to me that Hume should have held a Content-Contrary 
account. Given Hume’s commitment to the thesis that conceivability entails possibility, only the 
Content-Contrary account makes sense of how we can deny impossibilities. On the Act-Contrary 
account, we would have to conceive of the impossible whenever we deny any impossibility. For 
instance, take the impossible proposition that some table is wholly red and wholly green. If 
Hume accepted an Act-Contrary account, denying this proposition would require having an idea 
of a table that is wholly red and wholly green. This idea would be the content that is denied on a 
Humean Act-Contrary account. But it is impossible for there to be such a table. Thus Hume 
should claim that we cannot conceive of such an idea. So, if Hume accepted an Act-Contrary 
account, he could not coherently deny that there is a table that is wholly red and wholly green. 
On the other hand, if Hume accepted a Content-Contrary account, then he could coherently deny 
that some table is wholly red and wholly green. Hume would merely have to entertain the 
negation2 of this impossible proposition and affirm it2. (More on what it is to entertain a negation 
soon.) Surely, some idea is associated with the negation, since the negation is necessary. 
Therefore, charity seems to favor attributing a Content-Contrary account to Hume. 
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Moreover, as Powell (17) notes, there is some positive textual evidence that Hume held 
a Content-Contrary account. Consider what Hume tells us about the philosophical relation of 
contrariety: 
The relation of contrariety may at first sight be regarded as an exception to the 
rule, that no relation of any kind can subsist without some degree of resemblance. 
But let us consider, that no two ideas are in themselves contrary, except those of 
existence and non-existence, which are plainly resembling, as implying both of 
them an idea of the object; tho’ the latter excludes the object from all times and 
places, in which it is suppos’d not to exist. (T.1.1.5.6; SBN 15, his emphasis) 
Powell interprets this passage as suggesting the following: “Hume is positing that the only ideas 
standing in the relation of contrariety are those of particular existents and particular nonexistents 
(i.e., absences)” (Powell, 17). I assume that Hume believes some things stand in the relation of 
contrariety.13 Then Hume seems to have committed himself to a Content-Contrary account of 
denial. (Though I will dispute later this inference in section 3.) Since—for Hume—any idea of 
the Sun represents the Sun as existing, Hume seems to have committed himself to the claim that 
some other idea has a contrary content, representing the Sun as not existing. As Hume put it in 
the above passage, the idea of a thing’s non-existence “excludes the object from all times and 
places, in which it is suppos’d not to exist” (T.1.1.5.6; SBN 15).14 
 
2.2. The Exclusion Account 
Hume’s talk of exclusion suggests an intuitive account of denial: For an agent S to deny a 
proposition p is for S to affirm a proposition that S believes is incompatible with p.15 In Humean 
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terms, the proposal is that to deny a proposition p is to have a lively idea that one believes is 
incompatible with the idea (if any) associated with p.16 In a slogan: To deny is to affirm 
something that excludes. Call this Content-Contrary account “the exclusion account.”17 
Powell defends the exclusion account:18 
[This view] posits what I will call relationally negative contents. That is to say, all 
contents are, fundamentally, positive contents, but some of them conflict with 
each other . . . . The approach starts by identifying certain positive ideas which 
are, in short, too crowded to include Dumbo [an example object]. As a silly 
example, we could consider the idea of a world that is entirely filled with 
chocolate pudding. Now, this idea is a positive idea of a pudding-filled world. But 
if we take our idea of Dumbo and compare it to this pudding-filled-world-idea, 
there will be a sort of conflict between them: we can’t add Dumbo to the pudding-
world, because every place he might go in that world is already occupied by 
pudding. So, this pudding-world can, in addition to being a positive idea, be an 
idea that conflicts with the idea of Dumbo. It is a pair of positive ideas, such that 
you can’t believe in both of them at once. (Powell, 16, his emphasis) 
To deny that Dumbo exists is to believe something—have some lively idea—that one believes is 
incompatible with Dumbo’s existence. The idea of a pudding-world without any more room for 
anything else will do. Here is another example: To deny that Wittgenstein is alive is to believe 
something that one believes is incompatible with Wittgenstein’s being alive now. The idea of 
Wittgenstein’s death in 1951 will do. Intuitively, the exclusion account says that to deny 
something3 is to believe something else that rules it3 out. 
Powell tells us more about this Content-Contrary account: 
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A natural concern about this proposal is that it might seem like believing that 
Dumbo doesn’t exist requires believing that the world is entirely full of pudding . 
. . . The idea of pudding-world is not the only idea that crowds out Dumbo. It is 
merely one example . . . . What would be ideal is to collect together the set of all 
such ideas, for use as the general idea of Dumbo’s absence or nonexistence. As a 
sort of resemblance nominalist, Hume could really give us an account of this 
general idea only if there were some resemblance among all of these ideas, 
though. And it seems like, say, the idea of a world entirely filled with lead doesn’t 
resemble the pudding-world in any interesting respect . . . . The only feature these 
disparate ideas will all have in common is Dumbo-exclusion. So we could group 
them together in respect of their relationship to Dumbo. But this is a good feature 
to have in our account, as it both explains how the idea of Dumbo would be 
related to the production of the idea of the nonexistence of Dumbo, as well as 
helping us see why the idea of the absence of Dumbo differs from the idea of the 
absence of Pegasus . . . . Some Dumbo-allowing worlds still rule out Pegasus, and 
some Dumbo-excluding worlds still allow Pegasus. (Powell, 16) 
The idea of Dumbo’s nonexistence, then, is a general idea that, as it were, contains all particular 
ideas incompatible with Dumbo’s existence.19 To deny Dumbo’s existence is to have one of these 
ideas in a lively manner. 
The exclusion account is a natural view to attribute to Hume.20 As we saw earlier, Hume 
can evade Reid’s dilemma if he accepts a Content-Contrary account. Moreover, it is unclear how 
Hume could make sense of denying impossibilities unless he accepted a Content-Contrary 
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account. Finally, the exclusion account seems to make sense of what little Hume tells us about 
denial. 
 
3. Excluding the Exclusive Account Interpretation 
3.1. Philosophical Issue: Vicious Circularity 
But not all is well, philosophically speaking. The exclusion account suffers from vicious 
circularity. 
Recall that in Humean terms, the view states the following: To deny a proposition p is 
to have a lively idea that one believes is incompatible with the idea (if any) associated with p. 
The key word is “incompatible.” What is it for one idea to be incompatible with another? It is 
surely not for the conjunction of the two ideas to be metaphysically impossible. Recall Powell’s 
example of the pudding-world and Dumbo. The idea of pudding-world and the idea of Dumbo 
are incompatible. But surely their conjunction is not metaphysically impossible. We can simply 
imagine Dumbo on top of the pudding-world. But Hume accepts that conceivability entails 
possibility. So, for Hume, the conjunction of the two ideas is possible, despite being 
incompatible in Powell’s sense.21 
But what if metaphysical modality is too broad? Let’s see what happens if we 
understand incompatibility in terms of nomological modality—which concerns what is possible 
given the laws of nature. What if two ideas are incompatible just in case it is nomologically 
impossible for them to both be true? This, however, will not help. Suppose we believe that C1 
&…& Cn describe the laws of nature. Then it is natural, given our new understanding of 
incompatibility, to say that believing two ideas A and B are incompatible is to believe ~((A & B) 
& (C1 &…& Cn)). But if both (i) I have a lively idea of A and (ii) I believe A and B are 
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incompatible, the exclusion account will still generate a viciously circular explanation of how it 
is I can deny B. (I am also assuming that none of the conjuncts in C1 &…& Cn is denied. This is 
acceptable, since an account of denial should not rest on whether we have true beliefs about what 
the laws of nature are.) To see this, observe that the only way for me to believe the negation ~((A 
& B) & (C1 &…& Cn)) is to believe ~B, which just is to deny B on the Content-Contrary account. 
Denial would be analyzed in terms of denial! In fact, this circularity objection generalizes to any 
gloss of incompatibility in terms of any modality that is narrower than metaphysical modality.22 
 Perhaps the notion of incompatibility appealed to in the exclusion account does not 
appeal to modality at all. Roughly, the picture is that when I believe some idea A, I believe that A 
is incompatible with another idea B just in case I deny their conjunction. In Humean terms, 
something about adding B to A makes me deny the resulting conjunctive idea. Assuming one 
strangely believes the pudding-world is actual, this picture handles Powell’s pudding-world and 
Dumbo example well. One has a lively idea of the pudding-world, but denies that the conjunctive 
idea of the pudding-world and Dumbo is true. There just is no room for Dumbo, even if it is 
possible that there is room for Dumbo. 
Incompatibility then amounts to just this: Two ideas are incompatible just in case if one is 
true, the other is not. Equivalently, two ideas are incompatible just in case it is false that both are 
true.23 Therefore, the Humean exclusion account states that to deny some idea A is to have some 
lively idea B such that one believes ~(A & B).24 But on any Content-Contrary account like the 
exclusion account, to believe a negation (e.g. ~(A & B)) just is to deny that which is negated. But 
to deny A & B, one has to—given a lively idea of B—deny A. But we were seeking an account of 
how it is possible to deny A. Circularity rears its ugly head in once again.  
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So, as long as incompatibility is not understood in terms of metaphysical modality 
(which would be, as discussed earlier, independently implausible), the Humean exclusion 
account explains denial only in terms of denial. Perhaps one will initially find this kind of 
circularity unproblematic, or even virtuous. After all, for instance, any theory of truth will have 
to appeal to truths. But the circularity here may prove more problematic. If we are seriously 
worried that Hume cannot give an adequate account of denial, we will be unsatisfied if the best 
account of denial we can attribute to him is one on which denial is understood in terms of 
denial.25 But we were wondering if Hume could make sense of denial at all! Analogously, a 
chemistry teacher may be unsatisfied, upon asking a student “What are electrons?” if the student 
answers “Electrons are electrons.” A true answer, but one with less content than desired. 
So even if Hume held the exclusion view of denial, I deny that Hume can legitimately 
appeal to it. In the next section, however, I argue that this dispute is orthogonal to Hume 
interpretation. Hume imprudently accepted an Act-Contrary account of denial. If so, he is 
impaled on both horns of Reid’s dilemma. 
 
3.2. Interpretative Issue: Disbelief, Incredulity, and Fiction 
In section 1.3.7 of the Treatise, Hume resolves to determine “[w]herein consists the difference 
betwixt incredulity and belief” (T.1.3.7.3; SBN 95, his emphasis).26 Hume then immediately 
proposes the following answer: 
We may mingle, and unite, and separate, and confound, and vary our ideas in a 
hundred different ways; but till there appears some principle, which fixes one of 
these situations, we have in reality no opinion: And this principle, as it plainly 
makes no addition to our precedent ideas, can only change the manner of our 
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conceiving them . . . . So that as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which 
we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas an additional force or 
vivacity. (T.1.3.7.4–5; SBN 96, his emphasis) 
To answer the question of how to distinguish belief from disbelief, Hume speaks only of varying 
force and vivacity. This suggests that, for Hume, contrary beliefs and denials share a common 
content. Just shift the liveliness of the idea, and you may go from belief to denial (or vice-versa). 
But this is entirely incompatible with a Content-Contrary account of denial. 
Indeed, if Hume held a Content-Contrary account of denial, one would expect him to 
have said something about how the contents of belief and denial differ here.27 After all, it is in 
section 1.3.7 of the Treatise that Hume tasks himself with determining “the difference betwixt 
believing and disbelieving a proposition . . . [or] the difference bextwixt incredulity and belief” 
(T.1.3.7.3; SBN 95, his emphasis). Interpretatively speaking, such a gross omission seems best 
explained as no omission at all. That is, a complete lack of discussion of the differing contents of 
belief and denial suggests that Hume did not hold a Content-Contrary account.28 
Moreover, the Treatise provides positive textual evidence that Hume accepted an Act-
Contrary account of denial: 
An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone 
presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavor to explain by calling it a 
superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness. This variety of 
terms…is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities 
more present to us than fictions . . . . And in philosophy we can go no farther, than 
assert, that it is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the 
judgment from the fictions of the imagination. (T.1.3.7.7; SBN 629, his emphasis) 
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I take it that Hume is aware that we often imagine patent falsehoods. I am imagining a dragon 
flying over my home now, but it is patently false that a dragon is flying over my house right 
now. So, I deny that a dragon is flying over my house right now. But in the above passage, Hume 
seems to be telling us that, in general, the difference between the ideas we believe and fictitious 
ideas is merely a feeling. And this feeling is that of having a more or less lively, or vivid, idea. 
The most natural way of interpreting Hume here is to attribute an Act-Contrary account of denial 
to him. On such an account, the difference between belief and denial is a difference in the 
liveliness of an idea. On this picture, my denying that a dragon is flying over my house right now 
just is my having an idea of such a dragon with the appropriate liveliness. 
But if we are to attribute an Act-Contrary account to Hume, we must reply to Powell’s 
(17) claim that textual evidence supports the contrary conclusion, that Hume held a Content-
Contrary account. In particular, we have to make sense of the following passage: 
The relation of contrariety may at first sight be regarded as an exception to the 
rule, that no relation of any kind can subsist without some degree of resemblance. 
But let us consider, that no two ideas are in themselves contrary, except those of 
existence and non-existence, which are plainly resembling, as implying both of 
them an idea of the object; tho’ the latter excludes the object from all times and 
places, in which it is suppos’d not to exist. (T.1.1.5.6; SBN 15, his emphasis) 
This passage in fact indicates that Hume (incautiously!) held an Act-Contrary account. In this 
passage, Hume tells us that our ideas of existence and non-existence plainly resemble each other. 
This is straightforward on a Humean Act-Contrary account. On such an account, the idea of 
Dumbo’s existence and the idea of Dumbo’s non-existence are both ideas of Dumbo. They 
simply differ in their degree of liveliness or vivacity. As both are ideas of Dumbo, they 
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straightforwardly resemble one another; they straightforwardly “imply . . . an idea of the object” 
(T.1.1.5.6; SBN 15). 
But on a Humean Content-Contrary account, it is dubious that the idea of Dumbo’s non-
existence resembles the idea of Dumbo. Recall Powell’s pudding-world example. Does the idea 
of pudding-world resemble the idea of Dumbo? It does not. Certainly, they do not “plainly 
resembl[e]” (T.1.1.5.6; SBN 15). Moreover, the exclusion account’s appeal to a general idea of 
Dumbo’s non-existence does not help. Does the general idea of a triangle resemble Dumbo? No. 
After all, none of them implies, or suggests to the mind, the idea of Dumbo. But the same holds 
of particular ideas that exclude Dumbo. Just as an idea of a point-sized world does not imply the 
idea of Dumbo, the idea of pudding-world does not imply the idea of Dumbo. 
The only interpretative issue is that attributing an Act-Contrary account to Hume does 
not readily account for his offhand remark that the idea of an object’s non-existence “excludes 
the object from all times and places, in which it is suppos’d not to exist” (T.1.1.5.6; SBN 15). 
From the point of view of the Act-Contrary account, this suggests a comical image in which the 
nonexistent reside in a faraway Meinongian jungle, a place where the nonexistent live.29 Nothing 
there really exists. (Meinongianism is the view that there are nonexistent things.)30 
Perhaps we are not forced to attribute such a strange view to Hume. If Hume really 
believes in an Act-Contrary account, then to have an idea of Dumbo with the appropriate 
liveliness just is to deny Dumbo’s existence. If so, then some ideas of Dumbo—ideas of 




Here, one might object that, for Hume, any idea of any object represents it as existing. 
Therefore, would it not be odd if, for Hume, denying the existence of something required having 
a faint idea of that object? This idea, even faint as it is, would represent it as existing. 
This should be no obstacle to attributing an Act-Contrary account to Hume. After all, on 
an Act-Contrary account, denying an idea does not involve affirming anything about the denied 
idea. On such an account, to deny that the sky is green, one conjures up before one’s mind a faint 
idea of the sky’s being green. By doing so, one does not affirm that the sky is green, even though 
the idea she has before her mind—the (faint) idea of the sky’s being green—does represent the 
sky as being green. Things are no different with existence. On an Act-Contrary account, I may 
deny that Pegasus exists by having before my mind a faint idea of Pegasus, even though any idea 
of Pegasus represents Pegasus as existing. 
I have nothing else to say in way of textual interpretation of Hume. But if I am right that 
Hume accepted an Act-Contrary account, then he is in philosophical trouble. As Reid’s dilemma 
shows, Hume would be unable to distinguish denial from outright belief or mere conception. 
 
3.3. Other Propositional Attitudes 
If Hume does hold an Act-Contrary Account, Stroud seems right to point out that things get even 
worse for Hume: 
It is clear that, once we think not just about belief and conception, but about all 
the rest of the great variety of “attitudes” we can take with respect to a single idea, 
there is no plausibility at all in saying that they differ only in their degrees of 
force and vivacity. For any idea representing some state of affairs p, we can 
conceive of or contemplate what it would be like if p obtained, imagine that p 
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obtains, hope that p obtains, wonder whether it obtains, ask whether it does, 
believe that p obtains, and so on. But there is no temptation to suppose that 
wondering or asking is just conceiving something more faintly or more weakly 
than believing it. (Stroud, 75–76) 
Indeed, Hume’s problem with denial seems to just be an instance of broader problem with the 
propositional attitudes. Force and vivacity simply do not suffice to adequately treat them all. 
In fact, the problem for Hume is more acute with some of the propositional attitudes 
other than denial. For example, take the propositional attitude of wondering. I can wonder about 
that which I believe. After all, I recognize that I am not infallible. To take an example, consider 
my idea of sunshine in Saint Petersburg, Florida. It is barely a lively idea. That is, I believe that it 
is sunny in Saint Petersburg right now, but I am not very confident that this is so. Even though I 
believe it is sunny, I wonder whether it is so. But it is patently false that whenever I have an idea 
that is barely lively, I wonder whether it is veridical. Suppose I have a barely lively idea that the 
number of trees in Florida is even. Perhaps a biologist reported to me that the number of trees in 
Florida is even. (But I do not trust her testimony very much.) As I do not care whether or not the 
number of trees in Florida is even, I do not wonder whether this really is so. The question of 
whether this is so simply does not arise for me. This is a case of a barely lively idea without 
wonder. 
So, wondering cannot be captured merely in terms of force and vivacity. Hume, 
however, is committed to claiming that it can. Hume, being all too Humean, has unnecessarily 
constrained his philosophical theorizing. He needs more than force and vivacity to do justice to 




4. A Reply From Force and Vivacity? 
4.1. A Proposed Distinction 
Let us consider an objection to Reid’s dilemma. A defender of Hume might concede that Reid’s 
dilemma is compelling if Hume’s notions of force and vivacity are univocal, understood 
intuitively as the crispness or clarity of ideas. However, following Trudy Govier, a defender of 
Hume might insist that force and vivacity should be thought of as distinct.31 Besides their relative 
crispness, ideas may also differ in their “influence upon other . . . ideas” (Govier, 48). Ideas have 
different capacities to influence which ideas will arise in the minds of their possessors thereafter. 
For example, a crisp idea of having lost all my savings in a night of gambling would be more 
influential on succeeding ideas than a crisp idea of my having eggs for breakfast. 
Govier calls the crispness of an idea its vivacity, and the influence of an idea upon other 
ideas its force. Given this distinction, Hume may be able to resist Reid’s dilemma. Perhaps all 
Hume would have to do is to insist that the difference between a believed idea and a denied idea 
lies in the difference between their respective forces. If I believe that there is a fire in my home, I 
will be likely to later have before my mind grim ideas of my house burning down or even my 
death. On the other hand, if I deny that there is a fire in my home, then I will likely later have 
before my mind the idea of my sleeping peacefully in my bed. Crucially, this can be so even if 
the ideas associated with believing and denying that my house is on fire are both ideas of my 
house on fire. They may even be equally vivid; on the proposal being considered here, their 
essential difference lies in their respective forces. 
As Govier (47) notes, the following passage from the Treatise suggests that Hume 
implicitly accepted a distinction between force and vivacity:  
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A poetical description may have a more sensible effect on the fancy, than a 
historical narration. It may collect more of those circumstances, that form a 
compleat image or picture. It may seem to set the object before us in more lively 
colours. But still the ideas it presents are different to the feeling from those, which 
arise from the memory and the judgment. There is something weak and imperfect 
amidst all that seeming vehemence of thought and sentiment, which attends the 
fictions of poetry. (T.1.3.10.10; SBN 631, my emphasis) 
Govier suggests that “[w]e might sum up Hume’s point here by saying that ideas conveyed by 
poetry may be very vivid, but are not very strong [or forceful]—we do not take them to be true 
and, accordingly, they do not affect our other ideas as do the ideas of memory and judgment” 
(47). This seems to not be an unreasonable interpretation of the above passage from the Treatise. 
I have two objections, one philosophical and one interpretative, against using a 
distinction between force and vivacity in order to save Hume from Reid’s dilemma. 
 
4.2. Philosophical Objection: A Forceful Analogue of Reid’s Dilemma 
First, if we grant the distinction between force and vivacity, we may reproduce an analogue of 
Reid’s dilemma, but for forcefulness instead of vivacity: 
 
1*. If Hume’s philosophy accommodates denial, then, for a denied proposition p, the idea 
associated with p is (in the mind of the denier) either forceful or not. 
2*. If the idea is forceful, then p is affirmed, not denied. 
3*. If the idea is not forceful, then p is merely entertained, not denied.  




The only questionable premise here is (3*). And indeed, it may raise eyebrows. However, if 
premise (3)—which is just (3*) with “faint” or “not vivid” substituted for “not forceful”—of 
Reid’s original dilemma is plausible, then (3*) may also seem plausible by parity of reasoning. 
Originally, we were working with the assumption that affirmed or believed ideas were vivid, and 
so merely entertained ideas were not vivid. But it is unclear why things would be any different 
once we replace vivacity with forcefulness. Merely entertained ideas can clearly be unforceful. 
Suppose I am agnostic about whether or not there is an even number of dogs in Portland, 
Oregon. Suppose, moreover, that I entertain the idea that there is an even number of dogs there. 
This idea will not have much, if any, effect on the series of succeeding ideas that come before 
my mind. Intuitively, it does not matter to me whether or not there is an even number of dogs in 
Portland, Oregon. It is not at all forceful. Yet, I merely entertain it, neither believing nor denying 
it. 
At this juncture, a natural maneuver by a defender of Hume would be to insist that 
denied ideas are always less forceful than merely entertained ideas. If so, then along the scale of 
forcefulness, there are three divisions. Believed ideas would be the most forceful. Denied ideas 
would be the least forceful. Merely entertained ideas would be in the middle. If merely 
entertained ideas—and thus denied ideas too—are not considered forceful, this would entail the 
falsehood of (3*). 
But this is to throw out the baby with the bathwater. I reject the proposed division of 
labor. Some merely entertained ideas are less forceful than some denied ideas. For example, 
consider the denied idea that I will painfully die the next time I drive. While I deny this idea, the 
cost of being wrong is so high that I may—especially if I am prone to fits of paranoia—begin 
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entertaining all sorts of ideas about how driving could go badly or how one could die in the 
normal course of life. That is, even if I deny the idea that I will painfully die the next time I 
drive, this idea can nonetheless be forceful. (If it helps, suppose I hold a small but non-zero 
credence that I will die painfully the next time I drive. Nonetheless, I can deny this proposition. 
Surely I do not need to be certain that a proposition is false in order to deny it.) Now compare the 
forcefulness of this idea with that of the merely entertained idea that there is an even number of 
dogs in Portland, Oregon. This latter idea is not at all forceful. Since any forceful idea is more 
forceful than any unforceful idea, it follows that the denied idea of my painfully dying the next 
time I drive is more forceful than the merely entertained idea of there being an even number of 
dogs in Portland, Oregon. Therefore, some merely entertained ideas are less forceful than some 
denied ideas. 
And it should be even more obvious that some denied ideas are less forceful than some 
merely entertained ideas.32 Even if we reject (3*) on the grounds that some unforceful ideas are 
denied ideas, we must still recognize that denial cannot be theorized about solely in terms of 
forcefulness. Hume cannot give an adequate account of denial solely in terms of the forcefulness 
of ideas.  
What of giving an account of denial in terms of both vivacity and forcefulness? I take it 
that the only two viable options are conjunctive and disjunctive, respectively, in nature. But 
neither is acceptable. 
The conjunctive account says that an idea is denied if it is neither vivid nor forceful—
that is, if it is both not vivid and not forceful. However, this account of denial is too weak. Just 
consider once again the forceful idea that I will painfully die the next time I drive. Since it is 
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forceful, it fails to be jointly not forceful and not vivid. (It does not matter if it is vivid or not.) 
And yet, I deny this idea. Therefore, the conjunctive account is false. 
The disjunctive account says that an idea is denied if it is either not vivid or not forceful. 
However, this account is too strong. Just consider once again the unforceful idea that there is an 
even number of dogs in Portland, Oregon. Since it is not forceful, it is not forceful or not vivid. 
But I merely entertain the idea that there is an even number of dogs in Portland, Oregon. I am 
agnostic as to its truth. Hence, I do not deny it. Therefore, the disjunctive account is false. 
Not only is it impossible to give an account of denial solely in terms of forcefulness, it 
is also impossible to give an account of denial in terms of both forcefulness and vivacity. 
 
4.3. Interpretative Issue: Hume Sees No Distinction 
In any case, it seems Hume understood force and vivacity to amount to the same thing. In the 
Appendix to the Treatise, Hume explicitly states that he uses “vivid,” “forceful,” and the other 
words he uses to describe the feeling of believed ideas synonymously:33 
And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or 
vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may 
seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which 
renders realities more present to us than fictions . . . . Provided we agree about the 
thing, ’tis needless to dispute about the terms (T.1.3.7.7; SBN 629, his emphasis) 
Hume is here explicitly telling us that, for him, there is only one significant dimension, with 
respect to belief, along which ideas can differ: force, vivacity, solidity, firmness, or steadiness. 
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We should take him at his word. It is then not available to Hume to account for denial using 
distinct notions of vivacity and forcefulness. 
  
5. Conclusion 
I have ultimately argued for a pessimistic conclusion: Hume falls victim to Reid’s dilemma. 
Hume thus cannot account for denial. I have sketched what I take to be the account of denial—
the exclusion account—that (i) evades Reid’s dilemma and (ii) is most friendly to Hume’s 
philosophy. However, not only is there some reason to suspect that the exclusion account is 
circular, but Hume did not in fact hold it. He should have embraced the exclusion account. But 
he did not. Moreover, I have shown that Hume cannot avoid Reid’s dilemma by appealing to a 
distinction between force and vivacity. I conclude, then, Reid’s objection to Hume’s account of 
denial is successful. Hume cannot deny Reid’s dilemma.34 
NOTES 
 
1 Hume’s work is cited as follows: References to the Treatise are to Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Norton 
and Norton, hereafter cited in the main text as “T” followed by Book, part, section, and paragraph number, and to 
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, rev. by Nidditch, cited in the text as “SBN” followed by the 
page number. References to the Enquiry are to Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. Millican, 
hereafter cited in the main text as “EHU” followed by section and paragraph number, and Hume, An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Selby-Bigge, rev. by Nidditch, hereafter cited in the text as “SBN” followed 
by page numbers. References to the Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature are to Hume, An Abstract of a Treatise 
of Human Nature, hereafter cited in the main text as “Abstract” followed by page numbers. 
 





3 Though Hume (T.1.3.8; SBN 98) has much to say about what it is for an idea to be appropriately related to a 
present impression, I put this qualification—that a belief be appropriately related to a present impression—aside in 
the future. Nothing of significance in this paper rests on it. But it is noteworthy that “although [Hume’s] wording in 
both the Treatise and the Enquiry suggest that he is giving an account of belief per se, he is in fact doing something 
far more restricted. Specifically, he is providing us with an analysis of those beliefs that result from our experience 
of past conjunctions” (Jenkins, 80). Even so, as Jim Van Cleve has suggested to me, it seems Hume is wrongly 
bringing a cause of such belief—present impressions—into a definition of belief. But causes of x need not, and 
usually should not, appear in a definition of x. 
4 I say intuitive, not uncontroversial. Stroud claims that “whatever the difference might be [between believing 
something and taking it to be fictitious], it is clear that Hume has not captured it here. What he says is completely 
untrue in every respect . . . . This looks like a clear case of Hume’s denying the obvious” (71–72). 
5 Here, subscripts are used in order to make the reference of “that proposition” unambiguous. 
6 Reid does not consider the possibility that denying a proposition is nothing more than failing to have the associated 
idea before one’s mind, but this is an understandable exclusion. This proposal is wildly implausible. It would entail 
the absurd result that whenever I fail to have an idea of any tree before my mind, I deny that trees exist. Moreover, 
suppose that Ann has never seen or heard of snow. Suppose further that Ann has never wondered whether snow 
exists. She has never had the idea of snow before her mind. Then, on the proposal being considered here, Ann 
(automatically) denies that snow exists. But surely this is an absurd result. Ann might very well remain agnostic as 
to snow’s existence. 
7 I understand premises (1)–(3) schematically, with p as a variable ranging over denied propositions. I am also 
taking “the idea” in (2) and (3) to be anaphoric on “the idea associated with p” in (1). This makes the presentation of 
the argument in the main text simpler without, I believe, adding any substantial confusion. 
8 Strictly speaking, the inference from (1)–(3) to (4) is invalid. The inference is valid only if the following 
assumption is added: Some propositions are denied. I take it, however, that this assumption is obviously true. 




9 Dorsch (2016) points out a more fundamental problem for a Humean account of denial: Any such account fails to 
accommodate how “the contents of thought differ in kind from the contents of experience. For example, thought 
contents are subject to propositional logic, but sensory contents are not. If we are able to think that p or q, then we 
are also able to think their negation . . . . But we cannot see the negation of a green tree (which is not the same as not 
seeing a green tree, or seeing a red tree)” (48). The problem arises from Hume’s putting ideas to a dual purpose: For 
Hume, ideas are both the objects of thought as well as (mental) perceptions. I am sympathetic with Dorsch’s worry, 
but I will put it aside so as to focus on Reid’s dilemma. 
10 Moreover, Powell (6–11) provides several independent reasons why Hume should reject Act-Contrary accounts of 
denial. 
11 Note that there is no necessary connection between the contingency of a proposition and its liveliness. A 
contingent proposition can be either lively or faint. If I firmly believe that my shirt is red, then my idea of my shirt’s 
being red is lively. On the other hand, if I am unsure whether my shirt is red (perhaps I put it on haphazardly this 
morning and did not attend to its color all day), then my idea of my shirt’s being red is faint. But in either case, 
whether my idea of my shirt’s being red is lively, this idea is contingent. After all, I can easily conceive of my shirt’s 
being red and I can easily conceive of my shirt’s not being red. I can, for instance, imagine that my shirt is wholly 
blue. 
12 I will thus put aside the case where p is necessary. For Hume, we would be acting incoherently—nonsensically 
even—in denying a necessary proposition. For Hume, we cannot even imagine a necessary proposition’s being false. 
13 If not, why would Hume mention the philosophical relation of contrariety at all so early on in the Treatise? 
14 Powell (17–18) argues that there is other textual evidence that Hume accepts a Content-Contrary account, but I 
find this other textual evidence to be tenuous. Hume’s direct statement on the relation of contrariety, it seems to me, 
provides the strongest textual evidence. 
15 The qualification that S believes the idea in question is incompatible with the idea associated with p seems 
necessary. It really is incompatible with Wittgenstein’s being alive now that he died in 1951. But if I believe 




Wittgenstein’s death in 1951. In such a case, I believe the two relevant ideas to be compatible. Belief in 
incompatibility—not incompatibility simpliciter—therefore seems to be what is necessary for denial. 
16 The proviso “if any” is necessary because if p is impossible, Hume will not grant that there is an idea associated 
with p. If p is impossible, then I take it that—for Hume—having any lively idea whatsoever suffices to deny p.  
17 In personal conversation, Jim Van Cleve suggested to me an alternative Humean account. On this alternative 
account, a negated proposition just is a proposition with a negation operator, or, in informal imagistic terms, a red 
circle with a slash through it. But this cannot be Hume’s view, since there is no simple impression from which to 
derive the idea of this negation operator. One does not have simple impressions of negation operators. And if the 
idea of the negation operator is supposed to be complex, from which simple impressions could its parts be copied? 
We never literally sense the parts of a logical operator. 
18 Powell (14n33) attributes the view to Don Baxter and Don Garrett, who suggested the view to Powell in personal 
conversation. 
19 This parallels Hume’s (T.1.1.7.10; SBN 22) treatment of other general ideas. 
20 Powell (15) develops another Content-Contrary account that he considers attributing to Hume. On this account, 
we perceive absences. An idea of my office without my keys is not only an idea of my office, but an idea of the 
absence of my keys. To generalize this account, to deny something is to have an idea of its falsity. In the case of 
negative existentials, one sees the absence of thing in question in any lively idea one has. While this is an interesting 
view, it suffers from what I take to be devastating interpretive and philosophical problems; Powell (20) discusses 
these problems. For this reason, I put this alternative Content-Contrary account aside in the main text. 
21 One might insist that we cannot imagine Dumbo inside of the pudding world since Powell stipulates that there 
simply is not enough room to fit Dumbo in this world. If this is right, then perhaps it is metaphysically impossible 
for Dumbo to be in the pudding world. However, I deny the premise that we cannot imagine Dumbo inside of the 
pudding world. We might just have to imagine that the laws of nature are different. Or, if one is convinced that the 
laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, one can imagine that pudding is less dense than it actually is. Or, if one 
believes that pudding’s density is essential to it, one can imagine that the pudding world’s borders would expand just 




why all of these circumstances—and any other circumstances that would make room for Dumbo in the pudding 
world—are inconceivable. For encouraging me to discuss this potential worry, I wish to thank Lewis Powell and an 
anonymous reviewer from Hume Studies. 
22 Thanks to a helpful reviewer for encouraging me to discuss whether modalities weaker than metaphysical 
modality could enter into the exclusion account’s understanding of incompatibility. 
23 The following is a classical theorem: ((A → ~B) & (B → ~A)) ↔ ~(A & B). 
24 Initially, I worried that this result would lead to a vicious regress. After all, on the exclusion account, to deny (A & 
B) just is to deny, for some lively idea C, (A & B & C). But to deny this would involve denying another, even bigger, 
conjunction. But this regress now strikes me as benign. To deny all these conjunctions at once, one just needs to 
deny B—a conjunct common to all these conjunctions. One denial unproblematically generates all the denials 
posited. 
25 For this reason, it would be unacceptable for Hume to take exclusion to be primitive. Of course negation can be 
understood in terms of exclusion—the notion of exclusion is already so similar to the notion of negation. Moreover, 
an account of negation in terms of a new primitive, exclusion, will prevent Hume from achieving his ambitious 
plans to understand belief and denial solely in terms of impressions, ideas, and their force and vivacity. 
26 In the third edition to Bailey’s celebrated An Universal Etymological English Dictionary (1726), which was the 
most popular English dictionary of the 18th century, “incredulity” is defined as “Unbelief, Unaptness or 
Backwardsness to Believe.” Notably, “incredibility”—which derives from the same Latin word (incredulus) as 
“incredulity”—is defined as “being incredible, or past Belief.” Hume did not publish the Treatise until 1738.  
27 Here, I am rejecting Powell’s (18) claim that the lack of explicit discussion of denial in Hume indicates that Hume 
held a Content-Contrary account. Rather, the lack of such discussion is indicative of his holding an Act-Contrary 
account. 
28 Stroud (75) makes this very point. 
29 I say this despite being sympathetic to Meinongianism, but that is another matter. What is important is that Hume 
clearly rejects Meinongianism. Any idea of any object, for Hume, represents that object as existent. 




31 Govier does not discuss Reid’s dilemma. But, as I will soon discuss, the distinction she makes between force and 
vivacity may seem appealing to a philosopher who wishes to defend Hume against Reid’s dilemma. 
32  For instance, consider the denied idea that tomatoes are vegetables and the merely entertained (at the time of 
submitting this paper) idea that this paper is published in Hume Studies. The former is unforceful. The latter is 
forceful. 
33 Govier recognizes this: “As Hume himself reports in the Appendix, he . . . would not have 
made the distinction between the force of an idea and its vivacity” (46). 
34 For helpful conversations on the topic of this paper, I thank David Clark, Troy Cross, Jeremy Goodman, John 
Hawthorne, Laura Nicoară, and Weng Kin San. For helpful comments on the paper, I thank Lewis Powell, Nick 
Zangwill, and two anonymous reviewers from Hume Studies. Most of all, however, I wish to thank Jim Van Cleve. 
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